Does Employer Learning Vary by Occupation? by Hani Mansour


















































© DIW Berlin, 2010 
 
DIW Berlin 
German Institute for Economic Research 
Mohrenstr. 58 
10117 Berlin 
Tel. +49 (30) 897 89-0 
Fax +49 (30) 897 89-200 
http://www.diw.de 
 
ISSN print edition 1433-0210 
ISSN electronic edition 1619-4535 
 
Available for free downloading from the DIW Berlin website. 
 
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin are indexed in RePEc and SSRN. 





 Does Employer Learning Vary by Occupation?
Hani Mansour
University of Colorado Denver and DIW Berlin￿
May, 2010
Abstract
Models in which employers learn about the productivity of young workers, such as
Altonji and Pierret (2001), have two principal implications: First, the distribution of
wages becomes more dispersed as a cohort of workers gains experience; second, the
coe¢ cient on a variable that employers initially do not observe, such as the Armed
Forces Quali￿cation Test (AFQT) score, grows with experience. If employers￿learning
varies signi￿cantly across occupations, both of these indicators of learning should covary
positively across groups de￿ned by a worker￿ s occupational assignment at labor market
entry. This paper tests this implication of the employer learning model using data from
the NLSY and CPS. I ￿nd that occupations with high growth in the variance of residual
wages over the ￿rst ten years of the worker￿ s career are also the occupations with high
growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient, con￿rming the learning perspective. Interestingly,
occupations that my analysis characterizes as having a low level of employer learning
are not occupations where employers know little about the worker after ten years
of experience; instead they appear to be occupations where employers have already
learned about the worker￿ s AFQT score at the time of hire. I provide several pieces of
evidence that occupational assignment a⁄ects the learning process independently from
education and that the results are not driven by workers￿occupational mobility.
JEL Codes: J24, J31, J71, J62
Keywords: Wage Dynamics, Occupational Choice, Earnings Inequality.
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lunch participants at the University of California, Berkeley for their valuable comments and suggestions. 1 Introduction
Employers often hire new inexperienced workers without observing their full productivity.
Instead, they assess a worker￿ s value to the ￿rm based on information they receive from
job interviews, resumes, and recommendations (Spence, 1973). Altonji and Pierret (2001)
[hereinafter AP] show that if employers learn about the worker￿ s productivity, the coe¢ cient
of an ability correlate which is initially unobserved by employers, such as the Armed Forces
Quali￿cation Test (AFQT) score, increases with experience. AP￿ s analysis, and most other
models that use a learning framework, assume that learning is independent of job assignment.
It is likely, however, that employers￿learning varies signi￿cantly across occupations.1
Another principal implication of employer learning is that the distribution of wages be-
comes more dispersed as a cohort of workers gains experience (Neal and Rosen, 1998). If
in fact employers￿learning varies across occupations, both of these indicators - the growth
in the AFQT coe¢ cient and the growth in wage dispersion should covary positively across
groups de￿ned by a worker￿ s occupational assignment. This paper tests this implication of
the employer learning model and provides evidence con￿rming the learning perspective.2
Conceptually, learning might di⁄er across occupations because of level di⁄erences in the
variance of individual ability generated from non-random sorting into occupations or because
the technology or tasks in each occupation a⁄ect the speed at which employers learn.3 The
1An exception is Altonji (2005) who presents a framework in which the rate of employer learning depends
on the skill level of the job to show how, in this environment, statistical discrimination at the time of
hire a⁄ects employment rates and wage growth, but he does not test the model empirically. In addition,
Antonovics and Golan (2007), motivate the idea of "job shopping" within ￿rms using a model in which
learning di⁄ers across jobs.
2Matching models, such as Jovanovic￿ s (1979a) model, also generate increased wage dispersion with
experience. Miller (1984) discusses an environment where workers learn about the quality of their match
at di⁄erent rates across occupations. The analysis I use help in distinguishing between the learning and
occupational matching hypotheses.
3Consider the following example: Suppose that the true cross-sectional productivity variance in occu-
1main contribution of the paper is to provide evidence that initial occupational assignments
are associated with di⁄erent learning parameters. The occupational analysis provides several
pieces of evidence that distinguish the learning hypothesis from other competing hypotheses,
such as on-the-job training (OJT), and improved match quality with experience. The results
have important implications for various models in labor economics that use such frameworks.
These include models of statistical discrimination, earnings inequality, occupational mobility,
wage dynamics within ￿rms, occupational wage di⁄erences, and labor market signaling.4
The model in the paper follows closely that of AP and Lange (2007) [hereinafter Lange].5
Identical employers form expectations about the worker￿ s productivity, and in each period
update their initial belief based on a noisy signal of output produced by the worker. Lange
shows that the speed of employer learning depends on the variance of the initial error that
employers have and the variance of the noisy signal of output. Both AP and Lange assume
that employer learning is independent of job assignment. In this paper, the variance of the
initial error and the precision of the signal of output vary by initial occupational assignment.
Throughout the analysis, I do not model initial occupational choice and assume that it is
associated with a ￿xed learning parameter for the worker￿ s entire career.6 This is a limitation
pation A is twice the level in occupation B. Suppose that at the start of the career, employers in both
occupations know nothing about their potential hires, so that the variance of pay is zero in occupation A
and B. Assume that after ￿ve years employers in both occupations have learned half of what there is to
know about the workers. In this example, the growth in the cross-sectional variance of pay will be larger in
occupation A compared to occupation B, even if the speed of learning is the same across the two occupations.
On the other extreme, occupations A and B can have the same level of productivity variance but employers
in A learn about the worker￿ s productivity in 2 years while completing the learning process takes 5 years in
occupation B.
4Some of the relevant references are Topel and Ward (1992), Gibbons et. al (2005), Gibbons and Waldman
(1999; 2006), Lemieux (2006), Lange (2007), among others.
5AP￿ s learning model closely follows that of Farber and Gibbons (1996). One important di⁄erence between
the two is that FB estimate a wage level regression while AP￿ s dependent variable is the logarithm of wages.
6The idea here is that the initial occupation sets the worker on a speci￿c career track. Since employer
learning occurs early in the worker￿ s experience pro￿le, initial job assignment is likely to play the strongest
role in revealing the worker￿ s ability and thus a⁄ecting her subsequent occupational assignments.
2since di⁄erent occupational sorting patterns can generate di⁄erences in the level of cross-
sectional productivity variance. In the empirical analysis I provide evidence that occupations
with di⁄erent learning parameters do not appear to have di⁄erent underlying variance in the
AFQT score.
I test two principal hypotheses. If di⁄erences in employer learning across initial occupa-
tional assignments are empirically signi￿cant, the growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient and the
growth in wage dispersion, the two measures of learning I use, will be similar within groups
of occupations with similar employer learning patterns. In contrast, the two measures of
learning will di⁄er across occupations with di⁄erent learning parameters.7
Empirically, I use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation
Group (ORG) for the 1984-2000 period to calculate the two-digit occupation residual variance
at each experience level in the ￿rst ten years of the worker￿ s career.8 I then calculate the
growth in wage dispersion for workers at di⁄erent stages in the experience pro￿le.9;10 I merge
the estimated growth rates with the ￿rst occupation that workers report in the 1979 National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and compare the growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient
7The ￿ ow of information about the worker is public and observed by all labor market participants. The
debate in the literature wether information ￿ ows symmetrically across employers has not been resolved yet.
Recent papers such as Kahn (2007) and Sch￿nberg (2007) use a learning model to test whether information
between employers is symmetric. Although they use the same data set they reach opposite conclusions.
8I focus on the ￿rst 10 years in the worker￿ s career since most of the employer learning occurs early in
the experience pro￿le. Lange estimates that employers￿initial expectation errors are reduced by 50% within
the ￿rst 3 years of the workers￿career.
9Ideally, I would want to follow the growth in the variance of residual wages for a cohort of workers who
started their career in the same occupation over time, rather than comparing the variance of two cohorts
within an occupation. This is not feasible in the NLSY79 because of sample size limitations. In section 5,
I perform robustness checks and provide evidence that occupational mobility is not the main mechanism
behind the paper￿ s results.
10The classi￿cation of occupations from the CPS based on the growth in the residual variance does not
change based on the window I use to calculate the growth measure. That is, occupations which exhibit high
growth in the residual variance between the second experience year and labor market entry are the same
occupations that exhibit high growth in the residual variance between the ￿fth year of experience and labor
market entry and the tenth year of experience and labor market entry.
3across occupations with di⁄erent growth rates in wage dispersion.11
My ￿ndings suggest that occupations with high growth in the variance of residual wages
are also the occupations with high growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient. I call occupations
with high levels of growth in wage dispersion and in the AFQT coe¢ cient "high learning"
occupations. Interestingly, "low learning" occupations, where the growth in wage dispersion
and in the AFQT coe¢ cient is low, are not occupations where employers know little about
the worker after 10 years of experience. The high AFQT coe¢ cient at labor market entry
in these occupations suggest that employers have already learned about the worker￿ s AFQT
score at the time of hire. I also show that my occupational classi￿cation into learning groups
does not change signi￿cantly if the classi￿cation is based on the educational-speci￿c growth
in the residual variance, con￿rming the important implication of job assignment on the
process of employer learning (Arcidiacono, 2010).
In order to test whether improved occupational matching rather than employer learning
explains the results, I restrict my sample to workers who do not change their initial occu-
pation after 5 and 10 years in the labor market and show that the results are not a⁄ected
by this restriction. In a separate exercise, I limit my sample to initial occupations that are
associated with low occupational mobility. Even in this limited sample, there appear to be
signi￿cant di⁄erences in employer learning patterns across occupations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a learning model which
incorporates the idea of di⁄erential learning rates across jobs. Section 3 describes the data,
11Focusing on occupation-speci￿c growth rates in the variance of residual wages compared to looking at
levels of residual wages is important since it accounts for the fact that employers in some occupations might
have richer information about worker￿ s ability, that is not related to learning. It also accounts for the fact
that levels of residual wages might be a mechanical consequence of how broadly or narrowly the occupation
is de￿ned and not of employer learning.
4and section 4 includes the empirical analysis and results. Section 5 includes robustness checks
and section 6 concludes and discusses future work.
2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Sources of Employer Learning
Di⁄erences in the learning patterns across occupations can be driven by the amount to be
learned in each occupation, because of di⁄erent underlying di⁄erences in the productivity
variance, or by di⁄erences in the speed of learning. A standard model of employer learning,
such as the one formulated by AP, starts by specifying the log productivity of individual i
as a function of the information available to employers and researchers at every experience
level and a function that captures the experience pro￿le of productivity. In the standard
model, log productivity does not depend on the worker￿ s occupation. To allow for this
possibility, assume that there are J jobs (or occupations) in the economy.12 For the purpose
of this paper, I de￿ne an occupation as the entire expected career track associated with
choosing a given initial occupation, so that a worker￿ s entire career is associated with a ￿xed
learning parameter. Worker i￿ s log productivity, h, at experience level x in occupation j is
decomposed into four components
hij;x = asij + bqij + ￿zij + ￿ij + ~ Hj(xi), j = 1;:::;J (1)
12Throughout the paper I use the terms job type and occupation interchangeably. The empirical analysis
will use occupations to test for di⁄erential employer learning.
5The variables (s;q;z;￿) describe the di⁄erent types of information available to employers
and the econometrician in each occupation. In (1), s represents variables observed by the
employer and the econometrician (such as education); q is a productivity component observed
by the employer but is not in the data (such as information obtained during a recruitment
interview); z is a variable observed only by the econometrician (such as AFQT score); and
￿ is an individual productivity component that neither the employer nor the econometrician
observe. ~ Hj(xi) is a function that describes the experience pro￿le of productivity in each
occupation and is assumed to be independent from s;q;z;or ￿.13
Non-random occupational sorting (which I do not model in this paper) may generate dif-
ferences in the cross-sectional productivity mean and variance across di⁄erent occupations.14
Variation in the underlying occupational productivity variance implies that the amount to
be learned by employers might vary across occupations.
Because employers do not observe z or ￿, they form expectations conditional on s and q.
In what follows, I suppress the index i. Assuming that these expectations are linear in both
s and q, de￿ne
zj = E(zjjsj;qj) + ￿j = ￿1qj + ￿2sj + ￿j, j = 1;:::;J (2)
￿j = E(￿jjs;qj) + "j = ￿1sj + ￿2qj + "j, j = 1;:::;J
By de￿nition of an expectation, both ￿ and " are uncorrelated with s and q and have mean
13The focus in this paper is only on time-invariant productivity components, such as innate ability, and
abstracts from time-variant components acquired, for example, from on-the-job training, although the two
are likely to be correlated.
14For example, the productivity variance may be smaller in occupations attracting mainly high ability
workers, such as engineers.
6zero.15 Calculating the expected value of the skill level in (1) conditional on the information
available to employers upon entry to the labor market (at x = 0), and substituting (2) in
(1) yields
hj = (a + ￿￿2 + ￿1)sj + (b + ￿￿1 + ￿2)qj + (￿￿j + "j) + ~ Hj(x), j = 1;:::;J (3)
The term (￿￿j +"j) in (3) represents the occupational-speci￿c initial error in the employer￿ s
expectation about the worker￿ s ability and is uncorrelated with s and q.
After each period in the labor market, an occupation-speci￿c noisy signal yjt of hj becomes
available to all employers
yjt = hj + ￿jt , j = 1;:::;J (4)
The noise ￿jt is job-speci￿c and is uncorrelated with the other variables in the model or
across initial occupations. As in other models of employer learning, ￿jt is assumed to be
drawn from a normal distribution with variance ￿2
j￿ and is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed.16 The worker￿ s output history available to employers in occupation
j at each experience level x is summarized by the vector yx
j = fyj0;yj1;:::;yjx￿1g. Thus, the
number of available productivity measures is equal to the experience of workers.
The speed of learning is the second potential source of di⁄erence in the learning process
across occupations. In a seminal contribution, Lange, building on AP￿ s model, formulated
the conceptual framework to estimate the speed of learning. I adopt his formulation but
15I also assume that the error terms ￿ and ￿ are uncorrelated across occupations.
16In the empirical analysis I use the two-digit occupation codes to look at learning across jobs. This
implicitly assume that the i.i.d shock, ￿, is the same across all the individual occupations under each code
and does not take into account the fact that within-occupation job heterogeneity might be substantial.
7allow the speed to vary across occupations. Lange shows that the posterior distribution at
each experience level x is normal where the mean ￿jx is




















j0 is the variance of the initial expectation error ￿￿j +"j. This implies that
employers in some occupations may predict better (or worse) workers￿productivity compared
to other occupations at the time of hire. The coe¢ cient ￿jx at each experience level is given
by ￿jx =
xkj








The speed of employer learning, k, is a function of the variance of the initial expectation
error and the variance of the noise from the output signal. Employers in two occupations
can have similar initial expectation error but di⁄er in the variance of the output noise they
receive each period. In this case, employers will learn faster about the worker￿ s productivity
in the occupation where ￿2
jv is smaller at each experience level, and ￿jx will converge to 1
earlier in the experience pro￿le. The speed of learning can be di⁄erent, however, even if ￿2
jv
is similar across the two occupations and will be driven mainly by di⁄erences in ￿2
j0. In the
extreme case where ￿2
j0 = 0, employers predict the worker￿ s productivity at the time of hire
8and they do not use future outputs to update their initial assessment.
To complete the model I follow the standard assumption that wages are set by spot-
market contracting, and at the end of each period workers are paid their expected output.
That is, Wj(sj;qj;yx
j) = E[exp(hj)jsj;qj;yx
j]. The resulting log wage equation is17
wj(sj;qj;y
x





yjt) + Hj(x) (8)
Equation (8) describes the relationship between log wages, the information that employers
have at the time of hire (sj;qj), and the information that becomes available at each experience
level.
2.2 Estimation Framework
Recall that only variables in s and z are observed in the data and can be used for the
empirical analysis. Assuming that s and z are scalars, the log wage process from equation
(8) can be summarized in the following regression
wjt = ￿sjts + ￿zjtz + Hj(t), t = 0;:::;T (9)
The main insight of AP is that if employers learn about workers￿productivity, the coe¢ cient
on a correlate of productivity which is not observed by the employer upon hiring, such as
AFQT score, should increase over time.18 We can estimate equation (9) by occupation and
17The conditional expected value of exp(hj) is (E[hjjsj;qj;yx
j ] + 1
2￿2
jx) = exp(E[~ hjjsj;qj;yx
j ] + ~ Hj(x) +
1
2￿2
jx). This is because the distribution of h conditional on (sj;qj;yx
j ) is normal. In the log wage equation I
denote Hj(x) = ~ Hj(x) + 1
2￿2
jx.
18The wage regressions in AP control for initial occupations ￿xed e⁄ects, but do not analyze the wage
dynamics across occupations. The proof of the main proposition in AP is not a⁄ected by introducing di⁄erent
9compare the evolution of the hard-to-observe variable over time in order to test for di⁄erences
in employer learning. However, because of sample size limitations in the NLSY this strategy
is not feasible.
Instead, I use the implication that employer learning should increase the variance of
residual wages over time. I calculate changes in the residual variance between di⁄erent
experience levels in each occupation and combine this information with the initial occupation
reported by workers in the NLSY sample. I group occupations with similar growth patterns
in the residual variance and test the hypothesis that occupations with the highest increase
in the residual variance between two experience levels will also be occupations where the
AFQT coe¢ cient grows the most.19
The use of the growth in the variance of residual wages as a measure of employer learning
is important since it accounts for level di⁄erences in the variance of residual wages across
occupations which might re￿ ect, among other things, di⁄erences in the initial error in the
expectations that employers form (di⁄erences in ￿2
j0).20 The analysis, however, cannot dis-
tinguish whether learning is di⁄erent because of di⁄erences in the underlying productivity
variance or because the variance of the noisy signal is di⁄erent and I am unable to identify
the parameter k for each occupation.21;22
informational structure across occupations.
19Theoretically employer learning generates growth in wage dispersion. However, there are other reasons
which can explain growth in wage dispersion within and across occupations. For example, the growth in the
wage dispersion in traditionally unionized occupations might be small even if employer learning rates are
high (Lemieux, 2006).
20Using the growth in the residual variance also accounts for the fact that levels of residual wages at
di⁄erent experience levels might be a mechanical consequence of how broadly or narrowly the occupation is
de￿ned and not of employer learning.
21Theoretically this might seem like a signi￿cant drawback. Empirically, however, I ￿nd evidence for
learning only in some occupations while I ￿nd that there is no learning in others so distinguishing between
the mechanisms behind these di⁄erences becomes less important.
22Riley (1979) tests for the screening role of education across occupations with endogenous sorting. Com-
bining Riley￿ s framework with AP￿ s learning hypothesis might be a fruitful avenue to disentangle the mech-
10One remaining related issue that needs to be discussed is timing. Two occupations might
have the same growth in the residual variance between the time of hire and 10 years into
the career, but in one occupation the residual variance stopped growing earlier than in the
other. To address the timing issue I calculate the growth in the variance between di⁄erent
experience intervals and test the sensitivity of the results under di⁄erent scenarios. The
empirical analysis o⁄ers more details about this point.
3 Data
Most of the analysis in this paper uses data drawn from the NLSY79 covering the 1979-
2000 period. The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women
who were between the ages of 14 and 22 when they were ￿rst interviewed in 1979. The
survey was conducted annually until 1994 and since then the participants are interviewed
on a biennial basis. The NLSY79 has been used in many of the studies of employer learning
because of two main features: detailed information on work experience allows the calculation
of actual rather than potential labor market experience, and most importantly, the sample
includes some variables that are correlated with ability but are not observed (or used) by
the employer, such as AFQT scores and father￿ s education.
The work history ￿le in the NLSY79 provides information on the hours worked in each
week of the year. In order to calculate actual labor market experience, I follow AP￿ s method-
ology and accumulate the number of weeks in which the worker reports to have worked more
than 30 hours and divide it by 50. I focus only on jobs after an individual has left school
anisms behind the di⁄erences in employer learning across occupations.
11for the ￿rst time and drop all observations before that. The month and year when a person
left school for the ￿rst time is directly reported by the respondents and is used as the entry
date to the labor market. An individual can go back to school and remain in the sample.
To construct my sample, I include only white or black men which leaves me with 5,403
individuals. I drop 2,256 respondents who left school before 1979 because information on
their ￿rst occupation and actual labor market experience is hard to determine. I drop 362
respondents who never report to have left school and 8 individuals who do not report the
month they left school for the ￿rst time. 5 respondents who never completed more than 8
years of schooling are excluded from the sample, and 101 individuals who do not have a valid
AFQT score are dropped. I ￿nally drop 606 additional individuals who do not report their
￿rst occupation.
Aside from initial occupation, individuals in the NLSY79 report information on all the
jobs they held between two interviews. I only use information from the job they hold at the
time of the interview (CPS item). I exclude jobs without pay, jobs at home, and military jobs.
The wage measure in the sample is the hourly wage rate of pay at the most recent job from
the CPS section of the NLSY79. I use CPS de￿ ators to calculate real wages in 1984 prices
and I drop wages below $1 or above $100. Finally, because the linear speci￿cation is almost
surely misspeci￿ed as we add more experience years (Lange, 2007), I restrict my sample to
observations with 13 years of potential experience or less. This experience interval captures
the approximately linear region in the relationship between log wages and the AFQT score
over the experience pro￿le (Arcidiacono, 2010). My ￿nal sample includes 18,700 observations
on 2,065 distinct individuals.
Since NLSY79 participants took the AFQT at di⁄erent ages, I standardize the AFQT
12scores to have mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. I do this by subtracting the mean
score for a person of that age group and divide it by the standard deviation for that age
group. Table appendix A1 provides summary statistics for the main variables I use in the
empirical analysis.
In order to calculate growth in residual variance by occupation, I use information from the
ORG CPS. The optimal way to calculate growth in the residual variance and attribute it to
employer learning would be to track an individual at di⁄erent points in the experience pro￿le.
Since a large panel that allows to follow individuals who had similar initial occupations over
their career is not available I conduct a cohort-based analysis. Speci￿cally, I calculate the
residual variance at every experience level for the ￿rst 10 years of potential experience in
each of the 1980 2-digit occupation codes. The ORG data set is adequate for the purposes
of this paper because it contains information about the hourly wage rate, the same measure
I use in the NLSY79 sample. Moreover, as Lemieux (2006) shows, the wage information in
the ORG is less noisy compared to the March CPS because it measures directly the hourly
wage of workers paid by the hour.
I pool data from 1984-2000 and keep in the sample only white or black men who have
0-10 years of potential experience.23 I exclude from the sample self employed and full or part
time students and individuals with below 8 years of schooling. I use the hourly wage rate for
workers paid by the hour (about 60 percent of the sample) and calculate an hourly wage rate
for the other workers by dividing their weekly earnings by their usual weekly hours. Real
wages are calculated in 1984 prices using the CPS de￿ ator. I drop wages that are below $1
23I analyzed other shorter periods of time such as 1984-1988 and 1992-2000. The results regarding the
growth in the variance of wage residuals within occupations are not sensitive to the time period. In order to
increase my sample size I choose to pool the entire period of 1984-2000.
13and above $100, and adjust top-coded earnings by a factor of 1.4 (Lemieux, 2006). Since
actual experience is not reported in the ORG, I calculate a measure of potential experience
(age-education-6). As it is well known, in 1992 the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics changed
the educational attainment question in the CPS from one that was based on years spent
in school to one that focuses on the highest degree received. I use the method proposed
by Jaeger (1997; 2003) to create a consistent measure of years of schooling (to calculate
potential experience) and to group individuals in consistent educational categories.24
4 Results
4.1 Ranking Occupations
I start the analysis by calculating the variance of residual wages by occupation for every
experience level from the start of the worker￿ s career up to 10 years of experience. I then
calculate the growth in the variance of residual wages for three intervals: 0-5, 5-10, and
0-10 years of experience.25 This choice of experience intervals should help me determine the
importance of timing in the learning process.
Although this growth measure does not account for the possibility that occupational
mobility might di⁄er across initial occupations it has two main advantages. First, this
24I do not report in the paper descriptive statistics from the CPS sample. The distribution of educational
groups across the sample period remains relatively constant with a steady increase throughout the period in
the share of college graduates and those with some college. The distribution across experience groups is also
similar across the sample years. This suggests that compositional e⁄ects over the sample period are small.
I also computed the distribution of occupations over the sample period and ￿nd no evidence of substantial
changes. Moreover, I analyzed the distribution of education by occupation-experience cells and found no
evidence for signi￿cant changes in the education level within an occupation over the experience pro￿le.
25I also calculated the growth in the residual variance between 0-2 years of experience. These alternative
measures do not a⁄ect the ranking and classi￿cation of occupations.
14growth measure does not confound the increase in wage dispersion due to learning with the
increase in wage dispersion due to an increase in the price of unobserved skill because of
skill-biased technological change (Katz and Murphy, 1992). Second, the growth measure will
not be contaminated by potential composition e⁄ects due to large changes in the education
and experience of the U.S. population (Lemieux, 2006; Card and DiNardo, 2002). In section
5, I address the concern regarding occupational mobility, and show that it is not what drives
my results.
The residual wage is computed from a ￿ exible regression of log hourly wage on an un-
restricted set of dummies for age and years of schooling. I also include interaction terms
between six schooling dummies and a quartic in age.26 To capture any year-speci￿c di⁄er-
ences I include a full set of year dummies. I also include a set of occupation dummies to
capture di⁄erences in the level of wage residuals between occupations. I weight the regression
using weights provided by the CPS.
To calculate the variance in the residual wages, I use the 1980 2-digit occupation codes to
create 45 occupation dummies and interact them with 10 experience cells. The coe¢ cients of
a regression of the squared residuals from the wage regression on the occupation-experience
cells (450 coe¢ cients) are the coe¢ cients of interest. I rank occupations based on the total
growth measure in the ￿rst 10 years (0-10). Ranking the occupations based on the growth
measure of 0-5 years of experience produces similar occupational classi￿cation, with very few
exceptions.
Table 1 provides a list of the occupations ranked by the growth in the variance of residual
26The six schooling dummies I use to interact with a quartic in age are 9-10, 11, 12, 13-15, 16, and 17+. I
do not include an unrestricted set of age-education dummies because many of the cells are empty. I do not
include other typical demographic variables like marital status and race in order to focus on direct measures
of skill.
15wages between 0-10 years of experience. The ￿rst six occupations, classi￿ed with the letter
"H", have the highest total growth in the residual variance. Importantly, the residual vari-
ance in this group of occupations grows both in the ￿rst 5 years of experience and between
5-10 years. Occupations classi￿ed with the letter "M" have lower total growth in the residual
variance between 0-10 years of experience.27 For some of these occupations the growth in
the residual variance is concentrated in the ￿ve ￿rst years of the experience pro￿le (marked
with a star). For others, the total growth in the residual variance in the ￿rst 10 years is
split evenly between 0-5 and 5-10 years of experience (marked with 2 stars). Finally, for
a small set of occupations, the growth in the variance between 0-10 years of experience is
concentrated in the latter part of the experience pro￿le. Thus, although the total growth in
the variance in these occupations is similar in the ￿rst 10 years the timing of growth seems
to be di⁄erent. Occupations classi￿ed with the letter "L" have low growth in the residual
wage in all experience intervals.
Notice that the ranking of occupations based on the growth in residual variance is di⁄erent
from ranking occupations based on mean education. For example, physicians have the highest
growth in the variance while college professors experience a much lower growth, but both have
high mean education. Nonetheless, some occupations with low or no growth in the residual
variance appear to have high mean education, perhaps re￿ ecting the fact that employers
in these occupations have more information about their workers￿abilities upon their hire.
This is an important point since Arcidiacono et al. (2010) show that learning is mainly
concentrated among high school graduates. I will show later in my robustness checks that
27The cuto⁄ point was chosen such that the total growth in the residual variance is statistically di⁄erent
between the two occupations around the cuto⁄ point. In this case, the growth of 0.15 in the sales workers,
retail and personal services occupation is statistically di⁄erent at the 5 percent level from the growth of
0.103 in the ￿nancial records occupation.
16the ranking of occupations does not change if I calculate education speci￿c growth in the
residual variance in each occupation.
Table 1 also lists the means and standard deviation of the AFQT score in each initial
occupations. As can be seen, although there are di⁄erences in the AFQT variance across
occupations, there is no systematic di⁄erence in the standard deviation across the three
learning groups. This suggests that di⁄erences in the underlying productivity variance due
to endogenous sorting is not the main factor driving di⁄erences in learning across the three
learning classi￿cations. I provide more detailed evidence on this point later in the paper.
4.2 Evidence for Employer Learning
In this section, I reproduce AP￿ s results using the updated sample. As discussed in section
2, the idea of testing for employer learning hinges on the availability of a variable which is
(positively) correlated with ability, is unobserved by the employer at the time of hiring but
is available to the econometrician. The empirical speci￿cation that stems from equation (9)
is
logWit = ￿s0si + ￿z0zi + ￿Ti + ￿s10(si ￿
Ti
10
) + ￿z10(zi ￿
Ti
10
) +  it (10)
Throughout the empirical analysis education (s) and AFQT (z) are interacted with expe-
rience divided by 10, so that the coe¢ cients on the interaction terms represent the change in
the wage slope between T = 0 and T = 10. Table appendix A2 reproduces AP￿ s results using
the original sample period of 1979-1992, and using the extended sample for the 1979-2000
period. I restrict the samples to include workers with 13 years of potential experience or
less to capture the linear part of the learning process (Arcidiacono, 2010). All the reported
17standard errors are Huber-White standard errors. In the regression, experience is modeled
with a cubic polynomial, and as in AP, I control for the 1980 two-digit occupation codes at
the ￿rst job, urban residence, race, year ￿xed e⁄ects, and a linear trend. The base year for
the time trend is 1992.28
Column 1 in Table A2 in the appendix reports the results of estimating equation (10)
when the sample covers the 1979-1992 period and the interaction of AFQT with experience
is excluded. The coe¢ cient on education is 0.049 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent
level. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term of education with experience is 0.022 and is also
statistically signi￿cant. As in other studies that have used AFQT scores in wage regressions,
it enters the equation with a positive (0.035) and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient (Neal
and Johnson, 1996). Column 2 uses the same restricted sample but includes an interaction
term between AFQT and experience. As predicted by the model, the coe¢ cient on AFQT
when T = 0 becomes close to zero and statistically insigni￿cant while the coe¢ cient on the
interaction term enters the regression with a large coe¢ cient. At T = 10 the coe¢ cient
on AFQT is 0.086 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. This indicates that
employers do not observe the worker￿ s AFQT score upon entry to the labor market but do
learn about it over time. Extending the sample to cover the 1979-2000 period does not
change the main results. As reported in column 3 and 4 in Table A2, the magnitude of the
AFQT-experience coe¢ cient at T = 0 is close to zero and statistically insigni￿cant while
the coe¢ cient at T = 10 is 0.080 and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. In both
columns 2 and 4, the coe¢ cient on the education-experience interaction is close to zero and
28The time trend controls for economywide changes in the wage structure during the sample period (Katz
and Murphy, 1992). I also experimented by adding a cubic time trend and interactions of the cubic time
trend with education and race. These additional controls do not a⁄ect the results.
18statistically insigni￿cant.
4.3 Occupation-Speci￿c Employer Learning
To test whether employer learning di⁄ers across occupations, I match the ￿rst occupation
of each worker in the NLSY sample with the appropriate growth in the variance of residual
wages of that occupation.29 To start the analysis, I group occupations in three categories
as described in Table 3. If the growth measure re￿ ects (at least partially) employer learn-
ing, the growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient should be increasing with the variance of residual
wages. After 10 years of experience, we expect the highest growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient in
occupations with the highest residual variance growth rates.30 In contrast, we expect little
or no growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient in occupations with low growth rates in the variance
of residual wages. I will report results from running separate regressions for each of these
groups, and then proceed by analyzing the sensitivity of the results to di⁄erent alternative
explanations. Notice that all models include occupation ￿xed e⁄ects, which among other
things, also capture level di⁄erences in the residual variance upon the worker￿ s hire.
Table 2 reports the results from estimating equation (10) for the three separate groups
I describe above. The results in columns 1, 3, and 5 show signi￿cant heterogeneity in the
29About 80 percent of the workers in my sample change their initial 2-digit occupation after 10 years in
the workforce. However, it may be limiting to consider only workers who never switch occupations. For
example, an entry level sales position in a ￿rm might be the starting point for many possible career paths
in the company, and thus we would not want to restrict the sample to workers who stayed in sales. The
real interest of the paper is in the entire menu of career paths that are associated with di⁄erent initial
occupational assignments. In the robustness checks I show that occupational mobility does not drive my
results.
30Following the growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient after 5 years in the labor marker (by interacting the AFQT
coe¢ cient with experience divided by 5 instead of 10) does not change the results qualitatively but simply
cuts them in half. A more ￿ exible approach would be to interact the AFQT score with dummy variables for
each experience level. I tried to follow this approach but the small sample size within groups of occupations
makes it hard to implement.
19learning patterns across di⁄erent groups of initial occupations. In column 1 I report the
results on occupations with high growth in the residual variance, they constitute about
10 percent of the entire sample. The AFQT coe¢ cient at T = 0 is negative -0.091 and
statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. This is di⁄erent from AP￿ s ￿ndings that
the coe¢ cient on the AFQT score should be zero at the time of hire. The growth in the
coe¢ cient, however, is consistent with the learning hypothesis. The coe¢ cient on the AFQT
score at T = 10 is 0.160 and statistically signi￿cant. Thus, occupations with the highest
growth in the residual variance are also the occupations with the largest change in the AFQT
coe¢ cient over time. The coe¢ cient on the education-experience interaction is 0.057 and
signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. This is again di⁄erent from the results in Table A2. One
way to interpret the increase in the education coe¢ cient over time is that high productivity
workers in these occupations receive a considerable amount of on the job training over time.
This, in turn, casts some doubt about interpreting the increase in the AFQT coe¢ cient
as evidence for employer learning since it might simply re￿ ect on-the-job training. In the
robustness checks I show that the AFQT coe¢ cient for high school graduates in this group
of occupations grows more than the AFQT coe¢ cient for college graduates, supporting the
learning perspective.
The results in column 3 refer to the group of occupations with intermediate growth in
the residual variance and constitute about 79 percent of the sample. These occupations
have learning patters which are consistent with the results in Table A2. The coe¢ cient
on the AFQT score at the time of hire is close to zero and is statistically insigni￿cant
while the coe¢ cient on the interaction term of AFQT with experience is positive (0.082)
and signi￿cant. As in the results for the entire sample, the returns to education do not
20change over time. The di⁄erences between the coe¢ cients on the AFQT score at T = 0
and at T = 10 between column 1 and 3 are statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level.
As mentioned earlier, although these occupations have similar total growth in the residual
variance during the ￿rst 10 years, there are some di⁄erences in the timing of the growth of
the residual variance.
To further explore how these di⁄erences a⁄ect the growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient I dis-
aggregated the intermediate learning occupation group into 3 subgroups. The ￿rst includes
occupations where most of the growth in the residual variance is concentrated in the ￿rst
5 years (marked with a star), the second includes those where the total growth is split ap-
proximately equally across the two groups (marked with two stars), and the third includes
occupations where the growth is concentrated in the latter part of the experience pro￿le
(not marked). The results among the three subgroups (not reported here) are similar to the
results of the entire intermediate learning group and are not statistically di⁄erent from each
other.
I also tried instead of using a linear interaction of AFQT with experience to interact the
AFQT with the 10 experience dummies and check whether the pro￿les are di⁄erent among
the three subgroup. The estimates from this exercise are not as precisely estimated but
again do not reveal substantial di⁄erences in the AFQT-experience pro￿le among the three
subgroups. This should not be entirely surprising since, although I use the growth in the
residual as an indicator for employer learning, it is likely to capture other factors which are
not re￿ ected in the growth of the AFQT coe¢ cient but generate di⁄erences in the timing of
the growth in the residual variance.
The results in column 5 refer to the group of occupations with low growth in the residual
21variance. As expected, the coe¢ cient on the AFQT-experience interaction term is close to
zero and statistically insigni￿cant. This is an indication that employers in these occupations
do not learn about worker￿ s productivity. Of course, occupations can be low learning for two
di⁄erent reasons: First, it might be the case that the market has already learned the worker￿ s
AFQT at the start of the career; Second, it might mean that the market has not learned the
worker￿ s AFQT even after 10 years into the career. The large coe¢ cient on AFQT at T = 0
in column 5 (0.051) supports the ￿rst scenario. It indicates that the worker￿ s AFQT in low
learning occupations is revealed immediately, or soon after their hire. This is plausible if
employers in these occupations have access to richer information about workers￿skills upon
their hire (e.g. more information in q) which enables them to correctly estimate the worker￿ s
AFQT score.
To summarize, the results indicate considerable amount of heterogeneity in the learning
process across di⁄erent occupations. The AFQT coe¢ cient at the time of hire increases
monotonically as the growth in the residual variance decreases while the coe¢ cient on the
interaction term of AFQT with experience decreases monotonically as the growth in the
residual variance decreases.31
As I mentioned earlier, I do not model in this paper initial occupational sorting and
thus I am not able to distinguish whether learning di⁄ers across occupations because the
underlying productivity variance is di⁄erent or because the variance of the output signal
that employers receive vary by occupation. I address this issue partially by calculating the
mean and standard deviation of the AFQT score by occupation, and report them in the last
31I also tried to estimate the slope of the AFQT-experience pro￿le for each learning group. Consistent with
the results in Table 2, the slope of the AFQT-experience pro￿le increases with the growth in the residual
variance and is statistically di⁄erent among the three learning groups.
22two columns of Table 1. As can be seen, the mean and standard deviation of the AFQT
score varies signi￿cantly across individual occupations, but not systematically across the
di⁄erent occupational learning groups. The mean AFQT score for all occupations in the
high learning group is 0.313 with standard deviation of 0.927. The corresponding ￿gures for
the intermediate learning group is 0.009 and 0.981 while the mean and standard deviation
for the low learning occupations are 0.490 and 1.003, respectively. Thus, although the level
of mean AFQT score di⁄ers across the three groups, the standard deviation around that
mean is similar. This observation suggests, although does not prove, that di⁄erences in the
variance of the output signal play a bigger role in explaining di⁄erences in employer learning
across occupations.
It is also interesting to look at the coe¢ cient on the black dummy in the regressions
across the di⁄erent groups. Table 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on the black dummy in high
learning occupations is negative and large (-0.151), but is much smaller and insigni￿cant
(-0.022) for workers in low learning occupations (Column 5). An important insight of AP is
that we can use learning models to test for statistical discrimination based on race. Although
the focus of this paper is di⁄erent, it is interesting to show how the coe¢ cient on the race
variable evolves over time in occupations with di⁄erent patterns of employer learning.
The race variable can be treated as an s variable or a z variable. AP show that if
there is a negative correlation between race and skill, and employers use it as a source of
information about workers￿skills, the coe¢ cient on the black variable should be negative at
T = 0. However, if employers initially statistically discriminate against black workers but
learn over time, we would expect the racial gap to shrink, that is the coe¢ cient on race
to rise over time (decrease in absolute value). If employers, however, do not discriminate
23on the basis of race, the race variable can be treated as a z variable. In this case, if race
is negatively correlated with productivity and employers learn, the race gap will widen as
workers accumulate experience.
The results in columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 2 add to the regressions the interaction term
of race with experience. The coe¢ cient on the black dummy in column 2 is -0.171 and is
statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is positive (0.034) but is not
precisely estimated. In contrast to AP the results suggest (although weakly) that employers
in these occupations statistically discriminate on the basis of race. In occupations with
intermediate learning patterns, the coe¢ cient on the black dummy at the time of hire is
-0.032 and increases (in absolute value) to -0.089 at T = 10. This is consistent with AP￿ s
￿ndings that employers in these occupations do not discriminate on the basis of race. Lastly,
the black coe¢ cient in column 6, where there is no evidence for employer learning, is small,
positive, and not statistically signi￿cant (0.014). Again, there is no evidence of statistical
discrimination at the time of hire. The coe¢ cient on the black-experience interaction in this
group of occupations is negative (-0.064) but not statistically signi￿cant.
5 Robustness Check
5.1 Employer Learning Across Educational Groups
In a recent paper Arcidiacono et al. (2010) [hereinafter Arcidiacono] document di⁄erent
employer learning patterns across high school and college graduates. Their results suggest
that while employers learn about the AFQT score of high school graduates, the AFQT
24coe¢ cient for college graduates is positive and large at the time of hire and does not increase
signi￿cantly over time. Are di⁄erences in employer learning across occupations simply a
re￿ ection of the underlying educational composition across occupations?
Columns 1 and 3 in panel A of Table 3 reproduce the results reported in Arcidiacono
for high school and college graduates, respectively. The coe¢ cient on the AFQT score for
high school graduates is close to zero and statistically insigni￿cant and, consistent with the
learning hypothesis, the coe¢ cient on the AFQT score after 10 years of experience is 0.062,
signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. Adding initial occupational ￿xed e⁄ects in column 2 does
not change the results signi￿cantly. This is not the case for college graduates. Consistent
with Arcidiacono, the AFQT coe¢ cient at the time of hire is 0.080 (column 3), signi￿cant
at the 1 percent level while the coe¢ cient on the AFQT score after 10 years of experience is
small (0.037) and is not statistically signi￿cant. Adding occupational ￿xed e⁄ects, however,
changes the results signi￿cantly. As can be seen in column 4 of Table 3 panel A, the AFQT
coe¢ cient at the time of hire becomes smaller although still positive and signi￿cant (0.028)
and the coe¢ cient on the AFQT score after 10 years becomes larger (0.043) and statistically
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level.
To further explore whether my results are driven by the educational composition in each
occupation, I recalculate the education-speci￿c residual variance for every experience level
in the ￿rst 10 years in the workers￿career, by occupation.32 Table appendix A3 reports
the growth in the residual variance between the time of hire and 10 years after for high
school and college graduates. Table A3 also reports the growth measure used in Table 2
32In the remainder of the analysis I focus only on high school and college graduates. In some occupations,
there were not enough observations to calculate the residual variance at the di⁄erent experience levels. I
label these with NA = Not Available.
25and the percentage of high school and college graduates in each occupation. Interestingly,
the occupations I classify as high learning occupations in Table 2 are also the occupations
with the highest growth in the residual variance for both high school and college graduates.
Few of the occupations originally classi￿ed in the intermediate learning group would change
classi￿cation depending on the growth of the residual in the two educational groups. For
example, the growth in the residual variance for college graduates in ￿nancial records and
processing occupations is 0.186 which would classify this occupation as high learning, while
it is only 0.066 for high school graduates in the same occupation which would classify it as an
intermediate learning occupation. There are 8 occupations out of 27 intermediate learning
occupations where the classi￿cation would change by educational groups.
More signi￿cant di⁄erences appear among the group of occupations originally classi￿ed
as low learning. For example, while the growth in the residual variance is 0.104 for high
school technicians, except health engineering and science, it is 0.014 for college graduates in
the same occupation. In fact, for ￿ve occupations out of 11 in this group the growth in the
residual variance is higher for high school graduates than for college graduates.
Based on these ￿ndings, the main results of the paper in Table 2 should not change
signi￿cantly for the high and intermediate learning occupations when split by educational
group. In contrast, the results for the low learning occupations (no growth in the AFQT
coe¢ cient) should be reproduced only for college graduates.
Panel B of Table 3 reproduces the results of Table 2 using the original classi￿cation of
occupations. The results for the high school graduates in column 1 are in line with the
results of column 1 in Table 2. The AFQT coe¢ cient at the time of hire is -0.096 while the
coe¢ cient on the AFQT-experience interaction is 0.318. Similarly, the AFQT coe¢ cient for
26the college graduates in the same group of occupations is 0.008 and statistically insigni￿cant
and the coe¢ cient on the AFQT-experience interaction is 0.065, although it is not precisely
estimated. The results suggest that employer learning varies across occupations for both
educational groups.
The results for the intermediate learning occupations are also consistent with the learning
hypothesis for both groups of education. In fact, the growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient for
college graduates is bigger than the growth of the coe¢ cient for the high school graduates
(see column 3 and 4). As for the low learning occupations, the coe¢ cient on the AFQT score
is 0.066 for high school graduates at the time of hire and the coe¢ cient on the interaction
term is 0.098, both signi￿cant at the 10 percent level. This is di⁄erent than the results
reported in Table 2, column 6 where the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is zero. These
￿ndings suggest that employers observe (at least to some extent) the high school graduates
AFQT score but continue to learn about it over time. As for the college graduates in low
learning occupations, the AFQT coe¢ cient is large and signi￿cant at the time of hire (0.092)
while the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative but not statistically signi￿cant. This
suggests that learning across occupations
In all occupational groups, except for the high school graduates in high learning occupa-
tions (column 1), the racial wage gap widens over time, regardless of educational attainment.
Finally, reclassifying the occupations based on Table A3, where for some occupations the
growth in the residual variance is di⁄erent among high school and college graduates, and
repeating the analysis produces stronger evidence of di⁄erences in the process of employer
learning across occupations.33
33These results can be provided to the reader upon request.
27A competing hypothesis to employer learning is OJT which can also generate increases
in the residual variance over time (Ben-Porath, 1967). If AFQT and training are positively
correlates, then the AFQT coe¢ cient will also increase with experience. If the intensity of
training di⁄ers by ability (regardless of the direction of the correlation) then the patterns
across educational groups within groups of occupation should be di⁄erent. The results,
however, suggest that this is not the case. If, on the other hand, the intensity of training varies
across the three occupational groups for both high school and college graduates then the
current analysis cannot distinguish between OJT and employer learning. Collecting training
measures at the occupational level can be a promising methodology to fully distinguish
between the two hypotheses.
5.2 Occupational Mobility
Because of data limitations in the NLSY, the preceding analysis used the growth in wage dis-
persion using CPS data at di⁄erent experience levels within an occupation. The theoretical
model, however, implies that we need to track the growth in wage dispersion for workers who
start their career in occupation j over their experience pro￿le. Combining the cross-sectional
measures of variance with longitudinal data from the NLSY can be ￿ awed if occupational
mobility in the NLSY is substantial. Moreover, if initial occupational assignments are asso-
ciated with di⁄erent mobility patterns, the growth in the AFQT coe¢ cient over time might
re￿ ect improved occupational matching rather than employer learning.
In order to address this issue I generate a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
worker reported to be in the same occupation ￿ve years into his career as when he was ￿rst
28hired. On the aggregate level, the share of workers who do not switch occupations after ￿ve
years in the labor market is 21, 18, and 28 percent in the high, intermediate, and low learning
occupations, respectively. The high rates of mobility of young workers are not surprising and
in line with the ￿ndings of Topel and Ward (1992). It is encouraging, however, that mobility
patterns are not substantially di⁄erent across the three occupational categories.
To check the sensitivity of the results, Table 4 reproduces the results across the three
occupational categories when limited only to workers who did not switch initial occupations
after 5 years in the labor market. The results are encouraging as they portray similar
patterns reported for the whole sample. Repeating the analysis while restricting the sample
for workers who did not switch initial occupations even after 10 years in the labor market
also produces similar results but with less precision due to smaller sample size. I also
experimented by limiting the samples to initial occupations where 25 percent or more workers
did not switch occupations after 5 years in the labor market. The results remain in line with
the main ￿ndings but are not reported in the paper.
As a ￿nal attempt to address this issue, I calculated two measures of growth-in-dispersion
using NLSY data. The ￿rst compares the wage dispersion of di⁄erent experience cohorts
within an occupation (similar to what I did using the CPS data), and the other compares the
wage dispersion of workers who start their career at the same occupation, with their own wage
dispersion after 5 and 10 years of experience (regardless of the current occupation in which
they are in).34 I, then, restrict my sample to occupations for which the two measure are not
di⁄erent from each other. There are 19 such occupations (out of 45), covering 49 percent
34Due to sample size limitation, I was not able to calculate the residual variance at every experience level.
Instead, I aggregat workers with 0-5 years of experience and workers with 6-10 years of experience.
29of my original sample size. Examples of such occupations are engineers, administrative
occupations, construction trades, health technicians, and farm workers. As in the preceding
analysis, this exercise reproduces the main results of the paper indicating that the ￿ndings
I report are not driven by occupations for which the wage dispersion of workers over time
di⁄ers from the dispersion of cohorts within an occupation.35
5.3 Alternative Occupational Ranking
As I show in Table 1 the ranking of occupations, with very few exceptions, remains the
same whether I use the growth in the residual variance between the time of hire and 10
years into the worker￿ s career or the growth in the residual variance in the ￿rst 5 years
of the career. In particular few occupations that were ranked in the intermediate learning
group would be classi￿ed as high learning occupations (such as farm operators and managers
and teacher, college and university). Reclassifying these few occupations and repeating the
analysis does not a⁄ect the main conclusion that learning patterns vary across groups of
initial occupations.
I also experimented by calculating the growth in the residual variance in the ￿rst 2
years of the worker￿ s career and ranking the occupations based on this measure. With very
few exceptions, the ranking of occupations and their classi￿cation into the three groups of
occupations does not change.36 This gives me con￿dence that the paper￿ s results are not
sensitive to the growth measure I use to classify occupations into learning groups.
35These results were reported in an earlier version of the paper and can be provided to the reader upon
request.
36Obviously, the value of the growth measure and the cut o⁄points between the three groups of occupations
change but the classi￿cation of occupations into one of the three groups remains intact.
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In this paper I provide evidence that employer learning about the worker￿ s AFQT score varies
across initial occupational assignments. Employer learning has two principal implications
which I utilize in the analysis. First, the wage dispersion of a cohort of workers increases
as they gain experience. Second, the coe¢ cient on a correlate of ability that employers
initially do not observe, such as the AFQT score, grows with experience. If employers￿
learning varies signi￿cantly across occupations, both of these indicators of learning should
vary across groups de￿ned by a worker￿ s initial occupational assignment.
This paper tests this implication of the employer learning model. I estimate an occupation-
speci￿c growth rate in the variance of residual wages for workers with 0-5, 5-10 and 0-10
years of experience using ORG CPS data for the 1984-2000 period, and match these values
with data from the NLSY79. The results suggest that occupations with high growth in the
variance of residual wages over the ￿rst 10 years are also the occupations with high growth in
the AFQT coe¢ cient. I also ￿nd that the AFQT coe¢ cient in occupations with low growth
in the variance of residual wages is large and does not grow over time. This indicates that
employers in these occupations have already learned the worker￿ s AFQT at the start of the
career.
There are two di⁄erent reasons why employer learning varies across occupations. Endoge-
nous occupational sorting can generate di⁄erences in the underlying productivity variance
which will a⁄ect the amount to be learned by employers. Two occupations, however, may
have the same underlying productivity variance but di⁄er in the speed of learning. In this
paper, I am unable to disentangle the contribution of these two mechanisms, and this point
31awaits future research.
Testing the employer learning hypothesis by occupations is also a promising framework
to disentangle the learning hypothesis from two competing hypotheses, namely improved
occupational matching and on-the-job training. Finally, di⁄erences in learning across oc-
cupations highlights the importance of private information that workers might have about
their own ability, and how it might a⁄ect their educational choices and occupational sorting.
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36Table 2: The e⁄ect of AFQT on log wages by growth rates in the variance of wage
residuals
High growth in Intermediate growth in Low growth in
wage dispersion wage dispersion wage dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AFQT -0.0912￿ -0.0948￿ 0.0011 0.0126 0.0511￿ 0.0568￿
(0.028) (0.030) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.020)
AFQT*exp/10 0.1607￿ 0.1684￿ 0.0824￿ 0.0597￿ 0.0100 -0.0004
(0.040) (0.047) (0.011) (0.013) (0.029) (0.031)
Education 0.0394￿ 0.0397￿ 0.0558￿ 0.0551￿ 0.0691￿ 0.0682￿
(0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Education*exp/10 0.0565￿ 0.0558￿ 0.0045 0.0057 -0.0221 -0.0201
(0.016) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.012)
Black -0.1516￿ -0.1706￿ -0.0783￿ -0.0320￿￿ -0.0215 0.0143
(0.032) (0.053) (0.008) (0.014) (0.021) (0.038)
Black*exp/10 0.0369 -0.0887￿ -0.0640
(0.082) (0.023) (0.056)
Share of Black 0.23 0.28 0.18
R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.51 0.51
N 1,824 1,824 14,754 14,754 2,122 2,122
*,** indicates signi￿cance at the 1and 5% level, respectively. The dependent variable is log
real hourly wage. The experience measure is actual experience and is modeled as a cubic
polynomial. All models control for the two-digit ￿rst occupations, urban residence, year e⁄ects,
and a time trend with base year 1992. All standard errors are Huber-White standard errors
37Table 3: The e⁄ect of AFQT on wages by education-speci￿c occupational groups.
Panel A High School College
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AFQT 0.0175 0.0116 0.0802￿ 0.0284￿￿￿
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018)
AFQT*exp/10 0.0623￿ 0.0609￿ 0.0375 0.0438￿￿￿
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Black -0.0408￿￿ -0.0311 0.1240￿ 0.0139
(0.019) (0.019) (0.041) (0.034)
Black*exp/10 -0.0970￿ -0.0971￿ -0.1787￿ -0.1111￿￿
(0.031) (0.031) (0.059) (0.050)
Initial occupation NO Yes NO Yes
R2 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.33
N 6,933 6,649 4,510 4,219
Panel B High learning Intermediate learning Low learning
HS Collge HS Collge HS Collge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AFQT -0.0957￿￿ 0.0076 0.0123 0.0089 0.0658￿￿￿ 0.0921￿
(0.050) (0.051) (0.011) (0.022) (0.036) (0.033)
AFQT*exp/10 0.3179￿ 0.0650 0.0429￿￿ 0.0776￿￿ 0.0975￿￿￿ -0.0740
(0.087) (0.083) (0.019) (0.032) (0.058) (0.048)
Black -0.0568 0.1024 -0.0322 -0.0316 -0.0529 0.1280￿￿
(0.106) (0.084) (0.021) (0.043) (0.074) (0.065)
Black*exp/10 0.1416 -0.1350 -0.1051￿ -0.0899 -0.1374 -0.2457￿
(0.182) (0.117) (0.033) (0.063) (0.111) (0.091)
R2 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.31
N 327 636 7,726 2,916 546 649
*,**,*** indicates signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. See list of controls in Table 4.
Table 4: The e⁄ect of AFQT on log wages by growth rates in the variance of wage
residuals for workers with low occupational mobility
High growth in Intermediate growth in Low growth in
wage dispersion wage dispersion wage dispersion
(1) (3) (5)
AFQT -0.2580￿ 0.0020 0.0463￿￿￿
(0.061) (0.019) (0.021)
AFQT*exp/10 0.3353￿ 0.1093￿ 0.0126
(0.101) (0.026) (0.034)
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45
N 390 2,596 588
*,**,*** indicates signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. See list of controls in Table 4.
38APPENDIX
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics, NLSY79 sample, 1979-2000
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Real hourly wage 8.67 5.78 3 99.38
Log of real hourly wage 2.01 0.51 1.09 4.60
Education 13.81 2.45 8 20
Black dummy 0.26 0.44 0 1
Actual experience 5.38 3.50 0 16.26
Standardized AFQT score 0.095 0.99 -2.99 2.41
The sample includes 18700 observations from 2,065 individuals.
Table A2: The e⁄ect of AFQT on log wages
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Education 0.0488￿ 0.0561￿ 0.0475￿ 0.0560￿
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Black -0.0731￿ -0.0719￿ -0.0821￿ -0.0804￿
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Stan AFQT 0.0354￿ -0.0022 0.0397￿ -0.0016
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Education*exp/10 0.0220￿ -0.0062 0.0219￿ 0.0062
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Stan AFQT*exp/10 0.0856￿ 0.0798￿
(0.012) (0.010)
Sample period 1979- 1979- 1979- 1979-
1992 1992 2000 2000
R2 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.41
N 15,714 15,714 18,700 18,700
* indicates signi￿cance at the 1% level. The dependent variable is log real hourly
wage. The experience measure is actual experience and is modeled as a cubic
polynomial. All models control for the two-digit ￿rst occupations, urban residence,
year e⁄ects, and a time trend with base year 1992. All standard errors are
Huber-White standard errors.
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